Introduction
The United States is deepening its military engagement with Iran. It has deployed multiple carrier strike groups, and is now positioning more than 50,000 personnel across West Asia. But this is not the prelude to a ground operation against Iran.
In the previous article we saw how two decades of policy literature laid out the threat of an Iranian closure of the Strait, not as a black swan event or tail risk, but a baseline scenario and a central escalation pathway. I proposed the U.S.-Iran negotiations were intended to fail in order to provide justification for a U.S. blockade of maritime trade. An effective energy embargo aimed at imposing a form of economic chemotherapy on the global economy designed to kill U.S. competitors before it killed the host.
In this article, we will ask: Whether the U.S. is intending to use the Iranian blockade as the point of entry for a wider blockade against China’s maritime energy trade? To answer, we must first review the strategic literature on naval blockades against China. Then, we must examine how the U.S. military has been physically restructured to execute such a strategy. And finally, we will compare the current and planned force deployment with the scenarios modelled in that literature.
Part One: The Policy Literature – Twenty-Five Years of Blockade Thinking
Over the last 25 years, a huge body of policy literature has been published on the opportunities—and risks— a U.S. naval blockade presents. Strategy journals, think tanks, and military colleges have undertaken a systematic exploration of how to strangle China’s maritime trade by controlling a small number of geographic chokepoints.
A core insight of this strategy was first articulated in a 2006 Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) paper “China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward a New Maritime Strategy.” It highlights how China’s own maritime strategy identified dependence on sea lanes transiting narrow chokepoints, especially the Strait of Malacca, as a potential vulnerability. This would become a foundational premise for all later blockade concepts.
A 2008 Naval War College Review paper went further, presenting the first serious strategic discussion of whether China’s oil lifelines could be interdicted. The paper concludes that the strategy is feasible but operationally complex and politically risky.
The initial articulation as a semi-developed strategy arrived in a 2012 INSS paper, “Offshore Control” that postulated offsetting the operational risks of engaging Chinese ports directly by implementing a distant blockade. It argued the risk of direct engagement with mainland forces could be mitigated by controlling maritime access beyond the First Island Chain. Namely, via the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits, and the Luzon and Miyako Strait. Inside the First Island Chain, US forces would deny passage. Outside, they would interdict shipping. It emphasized that economic strangulation over time through chokepoint control offered greater escalation management. The goal: economic coercion.
One year later, Sean Mirski’s 2013 Journal of Strategic Studies article “Stranglehold” became the most developed academic assessment, examining operational, legal, and escalation dynamics in granular detail.
Development of the theoretical framework continued until the start of this decade when thinking shifted into more practical terms. By 2021, the theory was being operationalized. In “The Limits of Restraint,” RAND demonstrated how a distant blockade of major maritime choke points presented lower direct military risk than a direct blockade presenting scenarios modelled escalation management.
By 2024, this operationalization phase of theoretical development was almost complete. A Proceedings paper, “Employing Blockades in the 2026 Scenario,” emphasizes the importance of allied geography. It argues that the U.S. and partners sit astride the approaches to China’s key sea lanes. It is one of the clearest recent examples of the chokepoint strategy operationalization.
Although far from exhaustive, this review shows a clear evolution. An initial recognition of China’s structural vulnerability. The conceptualization of economic warfare through sea denial and its development into a distant blockade strategy. And finally, by the early 2020s the operationalization of this strategy with detailed assessments of force distribution; integration with First Island Chain strategies; and real-world applicability studies.
The documented policy evolution shows the idea of a maritime blockade against China is not fringe. It has been developed, stress-tested, critiqued, and integrated into modern U.S. military operational thinking.
What began as a theoretical blockade concept has evolved into a geographically coherent, technologically enabled sea-denial strategy—aligned with current U.S. force design.
But literature is not action. To understand whether the U.S. is actually preparing to execute a blockade, we must examine how the military has physically restructured itself.
Part Two: The Physical Preparation – The U.S. Marine Corps as a Missile Force
Starting around 2018, a quiet revolution started in the U.S. Marine Corps. By 2026, it had fundamentally transformed the service from an amphibious assault force into a distributed, land-based anti-ship missile force designed to deny sea passage at vulnerable maritime chokepoints.
The Conceptual Break
The 2017–2018 Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) framework redefined the role of the Marine Corps. It was no longer just about storming beaches, but operating as forward elements integrated with naval operations.
But the real turning point came was Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), which envisioned small, low-signature Marine units establishing temporary bases on islands and coastlines—firing anti-ship missiles, conducting intelligence surveillance, and supporting naval operations from within contested zones.
Force Design 2030 took this idea further mapping out in detail how the Marine Corps would:
- Eliminate tanks and heavy armour
- Reduce conventional artillery
- Build long-range anti-ship missile units, small mobile formations, and dedicated littoral regiments
The message was explicit: the Marine Corps was being redesigned to operate inside the First Island Chain and conduct sea denial against China.
This new strategy called for the creation of the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), a new unit purpose-built for island warfare and missile-based sea denial. The Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) made this regiment a reality. The new weapon system is a ground-based, unmanned launcher firing Naval Strike Missiles (range ~120–200 km) which can be hidden on islands, is highly mobile, and can be used to create localized anti-ship “kill zones” across chokepoints.
In 2025, the first operational deployment put NMESIS on the Batanes Islands in the Philippines—overlooking the Luzon Strait, a strategic chokepoint for both approaches to the island of Taiwan and a South China Sea exit point. The strategy was no longer a theory; it was being physical positioning to potentially control maritime routes.
Part Three: The Current Deployment – Iran as a Live Test Case
So, now we see the doctrine and the hardware in place, we can need to examine the actual US force package deployed against Iran. The question: does this deployment match the scenarios modelled in the blockade literature? The short answer is yes.
What the US Has Sent?
At Sea (The Blockade Core)
- 3 aircraft carrier groups – positioned in the Arabian Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and one more on the way.
- 15+ warships (mostly destroyers) capable of firing Tomahawk missiles.
- Amphibious groups with over 2,500 Marines – trained for boarding ships or seizing small islands.
- Mine-clearing ships – actively working in the Strait of Hormuz
In the Air
- Long-range bombers – over half the B-1 fleet and a quarter of the stealth B-2 fleet.
- F-22 and F-15 fighter jets – stationed in Israel, Jordan, and Gulf countries.
- AWACS radar planes (about 2/3 of the entire US fleet) and 1/3 of all refueling tankers – allowing planes to strike deep and stay on station.
On the Ground
What’s Happening in the Pacific at the Same Time?
While this Iran force is assembling, the US is also running large-scale military drills in the Western Pacific (near China, Japan, and the Philippines) with 17,000 troops and allies. Marine units are also being positioned there, ready for island-hopping and missile warfare.
So, Does This Match a Blockade?
Yes, perfectly. Blockade theory calls for:
- Distant interception of ships – the US has that.
- Warships to stop traffic – 15+ of them.
- Control of a chokepoint like Hormuz – that’s happening.
- Air cover, Marines for boarding, and surveillance – all present.
The conclusion is clear: This is not a theory. The US is actively running a blockade against Iran, using every tool the literature prescribed.
The Bigger Picture
Placing this operation in global context, it looks like Iran is a live-fire test of the blockade strategy. The US gains operational experience of a real blockade – learning how to manage escalation, economic pressure, and the complex military logistics involved – in a smaller, more contained conflict.
Those lessons will then be used to expand and extend the blockade to maritime choke points closer to China. The new Marine Corps tactics, the Pacific deployments, the missile networks, and allied cooperation are being assembled right now.
This is not two separate strategies. It is one global doctrine – control the world’s chokepoints – being tested on Iran, in preparation for a confrontation with China.
Part Four: Conclusion – From Hormuz to the South China Sea
So, the question remains: Is the US war on Iran the start of a veiled attempt to blockade China’s maritime trade?
Yes—but not in the sense of a direct, declared blockade of Chinese ports. The answer is more sophisticated.
The war on Iran is intended to be a proof-of-concept for a global chokepoint-control doctrine whose ultimate target is China. The force package, the strategic logic, the Marine Corps transformation, and the parallel Indo-Pacific deployments all align with a single operational plan: the ability to interdict maritime trade through a small number of geographic bottlenecks—Hormuz, Malacca, Lombok, Sunda, Luzon, Miyako.
Importantly, as the policy literature showed, this chokepoint doctrine enables graduated coercion—it is not an all-or-nothing blockade and it does not directly strike Chinese territory. It gives the US the option to climb the escalation ladder step-by-step. To gradually strangle China’s energy without a sudden shock that would provide justification for an immediate military retaliation.
Each rung increases pressure without immediate nuclear escalation. The Iran operation is a test of the first few rungs in real time.
The Vulnerability Remains
For all China’s efforts to diversify—overland pipelines, Gwadar port, Belt and Road infrastructure, Arctic shipping—its geometry remains unchanged. Most of China’s trade, and the vast majority of its energy imports, must pass through a handful of narrow straits. Those straits are within range of US-allied territory, US missiles, and the newly configured US Marine Corps.
The evidence—twenty-five years of policy literature, a decade of military transformation, and a current force deployment that matches both—answers this question in the affirmative.
The war on Iran is not a contained conflict. It is a live-fire exercise for a larger war yet to come.