“If the United States becomes deeply entangled in a prolonged war of attrition in the Middle East, it will inevitably weaken the strategic resources it can devote to other regions.” — Chen Long
Introduction
As the conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran nears its fifth week, a distinctive strategic calculus is crystallising within Chinese policy circles. While Western media commentary obsesses with its usual urgency about the immediate risks—oil price shocks, maritime blockades, and cascading alliance commitments—Chinese think-tanks and academic experts have been quietly sketching a different picture.
For Beijing, a prolonged war in West Asia, while destabilizing in the short term, could open a multi-year window of strategic advantage for Beijing. This article examines the emerging consensus among Chinese strategic analysts currently coalescing around five core propositions.
I. The “Strategic Opportunity” Thesis
A consistent theme across these strategic analyses is that a prolonged conflict would drain American military, diplomatic, and economic recourses, weakening its capacity to maintain its Indo-Pacific strategic posture.
According to Su Xiaohui, Director of the Institute for Developing Countries Studies at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)—an official think tank affiliated with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Iran is prepared for a protracted confrontation that will expose fundamental flaws in U.S. strategy.
Speaking on China Central Television, she pointed out that Washington initially spoke of a four-to-five-week military operation against Iran, but later allowed for fighting to continue until September. This change in tone, Su argued, shows the US has not settled on a final strategy for the campaign. She went on to argue that the operation “has already begun to backfire on the United States, which is now increasingly forced to factor in the potential consequences of its actions.”
In a similar vein, Li Weijian, a senior fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, draws direct historical parallels to the U.S. military quagmire in Iraq, which he characterizes as providing China with two decades of strategic space:
“The US gave China a 20-year window of strategic opportunity by launching the Iraq War and getting bogged down in the Middle East, which delayed its pivot to Asia. We breathed a sigh of relief and seized those 20 years to develop ourselves. Now, will the United States get bogged down again?”
This historical framing illustrates how a generation of Chinese strategists view prolonged U.S. military engagement in West Asia not as a crisis, but as a structural condition that previously enabled China’s rise and may do so again.
This emerging proposition favors a policy of “strategic patience;” a posture of cautious non-entanglement that allows the United States to exhaust itself while China continues its developmental trajectory.
II. Maritime Vulnerability and the Continental Alternative
Core Argument
Chinese analysts have identified the Strait of Hormuz as a critical vulnerability for the United States and its allies, who remain dependent on seaborne energy—if only indirectly by secondary order consequences via global supply chain dependence. Prolonged naval disruption, they argue, would accelerate demand for overland trade and energy routes—positioning China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a critical alternative infrastructure.
Jin Liangxiang, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, outlined the widely accepted framework this strategic framework within which this consensus operates in January 2026:
“If the military conflict between the US and Iran escalates, it will seriously impact stability in the region, as well as China’s energy security, its high-tech export markets, investments, and foreign financial cooperation in the region.”
He noted that 40 to 50 percent of China’s oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz, making maritime disruption an existential concern for Chinese energy security. However, Wang Dong of Peking University emphasized China’s diversified energy strategy provides a limited buffer against such disruption:
“China’s energy security strategy is diversified: it relies on multiple sources, routes and types of energy, reducing over-dependence on any single region. Short-term market fluctuations are manageable; long-term regional chaos is the real risk.”
The Continental Alternative
Chinese analysts have been quick to point out that the vulnerability of maritime chokepoints lends urgency to the development of overland routes. They point to the Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) network of rail and pipeline corridors through Central Asia and Iran as offering supply chain redundancy that sea lanes cannot provide under conditions of naval conflict.
Jin Liangxiang acknowledged, however, that such infrastructure is itself vulnerable:
“If the military conflict between the US and Iran escalates, it will seriously impact… investments, and foreign financial cooperation in the region.”
This tension—between the promise of overland alternatives and the exposure of Chinese assets in a conflict zone—runs through much of the Chinese analysis. The strategic opportunity of continental connectivity depends, in part, on the stability that a prolonged war would undermine.
III. Capital Flight and Hong Kong’s Role
Core Argument
A significant strand of Chinese analysis suggests that while capital initially seeks safety in the U.S. dollar during the early stages of conflict, a protracted war erodes confidence in dollar-denominated assets. West Asian sovereign wealth funds and private capital, already diversifying away from Western markets, will likely accelerate their shift toward Hong Kong and mainland Chinese financial centres.
While direct estimates of this specific dynamic are limited, the broader context of China-Gulf financial integration is well-established and ongoing. Multiple Chinese analysts have noted the deepening economic ties between China and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with the ongoing China-GCC free trade agreement negotiations potentially providing a framework for renminbi-settled (RMB) trade and investment.
He Wenping, Senior Research Fellow at the Charhar Institute and the West Asia and Africa Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), has consistently emphasized the “look east” orientation of Iranian economic policy. In a July 2024 analysis, she noted that President Masoud Pezeshkian “will likely continue to ‘look East’ in the future, fostering closer economic and trade cooperation with China.” Prior to the conflict, He characterized China-Iran economic cooperation as transactional rather than ideological in character. The deepening of economic ties, she suggested, needed to be understood as a pragmatic response to shared interests rather than a strategic alignment aimed at reshaping global industrial architecture. However, it is now widely acknowledged that the current conflict is altering that strategic calculus.
Conversely, while Chinese analysts see financial opportunities emerging from the conflict in a wider regional context, they do not frame them in zero-sum, anti-American terms. They point out the shift toward RMB settlement and Hong Kong-based finance from West Asia should be understood primarily as a diversification strategy—one that serves the interests of Gulf states seeking to hedge geopolitical risk, rather than a coordinated challenge to U.S. dominance on the part of GCC countries.
IV. Industrial Chain Reconfiguration
Core Argument
Chinese analysts have argued that a prolonged conflict would accelerate a restructuring of global industrial chains, potentially consolidating a model in which China serves as the manufacturing and logistics hub for global production. This configuration, some suggest, could grant China enhanced pricing power and rule-setting authority in key sectors.
Wu Xinbo, a scholar who heads Fudan University’s Center for American Studies and has previously advised the Foreign Ministry, articulated the dilemma this enhanced global economic role presents Beijing. While cautioning against direct military involvement in West Asia he suggested that China’s expanding economic footprint necessitates a reconsideration of how Beijing protects its interests abroad.
“As China’s economic footprint expands, Beijing should start thinking about moving from isolated, rare applications of military power toward a systematic and normalized protection of our interests abroad. This is actually a new challenge for us, as it’s only been an issue for the last decade or so. China is still in an exploratory phase—unlike the United States, which has been the leader of the Western world since World War II with military bases stationed everywhere.”
This framing suggests that while Chinese analysts see potential industrial advantages emerging from the conflict, they also recognize the gap between China’s current capabilities and its aspirations. The vision of China as the stable hub of global industrial chains sits uneasily with the reality that Beijing lacks the military infrastructure to secure those chains in times of conflict.
Zheng Yongnian, a government adviser and influential political scientist, has gone further still calling for an “urgent” reassessment of Beijing’s traditional policy of non-interference—but with important qualifications:
“Of course, the ‘hegemonic’ and ‘thug-like’ interventionist methods used by the U.S. are absolutely wrong and something we must avoid. But we must liberate our thinking and stop being so rigid about ‘absolute non-interference.’“
This schism represents a significant debate within Chinese policy circles: whether the principle of non-interference remains a strategic asset or has become a constraint on China’s global role.
V. The Petrodollar Under Stress
Core Argument
A recurring theme in Chinese strategic commentary is that the conflict represents a systemic stress test for the U.S. dollar’s dominance in global energy markets. With RMB-denominated energy trade already standard for Iranian oil, analysts see opportunities for RMB internationalization to accelerate.
Wang Dong of Peking University framed this dynamic within the broader context of transition from unipolarity to multipolarity:
“The past months have reinforced my judgment: we are in an era of transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, not a still unipolar world. The U.S. still tries to act unilaterally, but it faces stronger pushback from sovereign states, regional groups and global public opinion. More countries refuse to choose sides or accept hegemonic dictates.”
He continued:
“The very fact that many nations, including major powers, condemn or oppose military strikes shows that the old unipolar system no longer works. These crises are not proof of lasting unipolar dominance; they are the last spasms of a fading order. The trend toward greater pluralism, multipolarity and rule of law is irreversible.”
The Limits of the Thesis
It is worth noting that even as Chinese analysts highlight the petrodollar’s vulnerability, few predict its imminent collapse. The dollar’s dominance is understood to be deeply entrenched, sustained by network effects in trade finance, central bank reserves, and international debt markets that no rival currency—including the RMB—currently matches. What Chinese analysts describe, therefore, is not a sudden collapse but a gradual erosion: a long-term trend toward currency diversification that a prolonged conflict would accelerate, but not complete.
VI. Regional Perspectives: The Gulf Arab View
Chinese analysts have paid close attention to how Gulf Arab states perceive the conflict and China’s role. This perspective is critical because Gulf states maintain deep security relationships with the United States while expanding economic ties with China—a balancing act that shapes their calculus in any prolonged conflict.
Liu Zhongmin, Professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University and Vice President of the Chinese Society for Middle East Studies, analyzed the conflict’s escalation in a March 2026 interview with Global Times:
“The current conflict has entered a highly dangerous stage and is even undergoing a qualitative shift. Earlier exchanges of strikes between the US, Israel and Iran were largely aimed at military targets, with only limited spillover damage to civilian facilities and infrastructure. Now, however, the Middle East’s economic lifelines are becoming direct targets.”
He warned of potentially catastrophic consequences:
“While concerns previously focused on the security of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the situation now threatens not only transportation but also production. Strikes on gas fields and oil production facilities could put both energy production and transportation at risk simultaneously, with potentially immeasurable consequences for the global economy.”
On the prospects for mediation, Liu noted that China’s previous diplomatic success in brokering the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement has created expectations:
“Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi noted that countries including China could mediate, saying Beijing had previously played a positive role in brokering agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia.”
Conclusion: Consensus Amid Tensions
The available evidence from March 2026 suggests a discernible—though not unanimous—consensus among Chinese think tank analysts regarding the strategic implications of a prolonged Iran conflict.
The optimistic assessment—articulated most clearly by Li Weijian, Su Xiaohui, and Fu Xiaoqiang—holds that extended U.S. entanglement in the Middle East will drain American resources, weaken its strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific, and create a permissive environment for China’s continued rise. This perspective emphasizes the historical precedent of the Iraq War and sees current events as potentially repeating that pattern.
The cautionary assessment—advanced by Wu Xinbo, Jin Liangxiang, and Shen Dingli—warns against overconfidence. Chinese infrastructure in the region is vulnerable; the conflict could escalate in unpredictable ways; and China lacks the military capacity to protect its interests if the situation deteriorates. Most fundamentally, Shen Dingli argues that China’s current strength does not yet give it the power to shape a new international order.
A third perspective, articulated by Wang Dong, Liu Zhongmin, and Ding Long, focuses on the necessity of diplomacy and multilateral institutions. These analysts argue that regardless of which side gains tactical advantage, the conflict ultimately requires a negotiated resolution—and that institutions like BRICS and the SCO can play constructive roles as honest brokers.
In short, the emerging consensus is coalescing around the idea that a short war presents limited strategic difficulties for Beijing. A longer conflict may reward Beijing’s strategic patience by exposing U.S. vulnerabilities. A longer duration conflict, however, presents risks arising from global instability and damage to Chinese regional infrastructure investments.
The actual outcome depends on variables outside its control: the duration and intensity of the conflict; the coherence of U.S. and allied responses; and the resilience of the global economic order that China simultaneously participates in and seeks to reshape.
As Wang Dong observed, the lesson of Iraq remains relevant:
“Military ventures do not bring victory or stability. They bring chaos and long-term decline. That lesson must not be ignored.”
Appendix: Key Chinese Sources Referenced
Note: This article draws from publicly available interviews, think tank publications, and expert commentary from March 2026. All quotations are presented as originally published. The views expressed are those of the individual experts and do not necessarily represent the positions of their affiliated institutions or the Chinese government.